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THE AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY COVERAGE STEP-DOWN




"For every action there is an opposite and equal reaction."1 The rela-
tionship of Sir Isaac Newton's third law of motion to the drafting of insur-
ance contract provisions may not be readily apparent. The reality is that due
to the economic significance of insurance transactions for individual insur-
eds, insurers, and society, the dominant feature of the industry's landscape
is a continuous and unabated flow of litigation.2 Courts have used insurance
litigation as a forum for considering issues of important public concern.
Thus, it has been observed that:
[T]he quest during most of this century for an adequate and appropriate approach to provid-
ing indemnification for persons injured in automobile accidents has been an almost classic
case study in the interactions of (1) the public interest in providing compensation for acci-
dent victims, (2) the needs and capacities of the insurance industry, and (3) various attempts
by state legislatures to develop better approaches to using insurance to provide compensa-
tion.3
The above observation is apropos-an insurance policy embodies
more than an agreement between private parties. Unlike other types of pri-
* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. B.A., University of Mississippi, 1982;
J.D., University of Mississippi Law School, 1984; LL.M., Columbia University Law School, 1987.
1 SIR ISAAC NEWTON, MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY AND His SYSTEM
OF THE WORLD 13 (Andrew Motte trans., Florian Cajor ed. 1934) (1668).
2 Much of this litigation can be attributed to the nature of insurance contracts. Insurance policies
are standardized contracts of adhesion. The term "standardized" describes those provisions of insurance
contracts that are required to be included in every policy of insurance of a specific type. The language
used in these provisions is sometimes also statutorily prescribed and is thus referred to as standardized.
Typically, contracts are thought to be freely negotiated by parties of equal bargaining power.
However, this belief is far from the reality of the insurance industry. The insured--though he can
choose from a number of available policies-has absolutely no bargaining position in terms of the
substance of the contract with the insurer. The policy provisions-even if required by statute or other
regulation-are drafted by industry experts. Thus, the policy is offered to the insured on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis. The phrase "adhesion contract" basically describes the manner by which the contract is
formed. The insurer having superior bargaining power imposes its choice of terms on the insured. See
SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 19-20 (3d ed. 1973). Because insurance
policies are viewed as contracts of adhesion, a greater likelihood exists that the party with less bargain-
ing power will be subjected to oppressive and unjust terms. Consequently, courts interpreting insurance
policies are free to engage in interpretative techniques that counterbalance the unequal bargaining
position of the insured.
3 ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPALS, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 2 (1988).
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vate contracts, insurance policies are considered to have a large public in-
terest component.4 This public interest justifies constant judicial scrutiny
into the substantive and procedural fairness of the agreement.5 Conse-
quently, despite the fact that insurance companies enjoy the same rights as
others to limit their liability and impose whatever conditions they please
upon their obligation to insure, they are constrained by the requirement that
the exercise of the right to freely contract not violate public policy.
The insurance industry's struggle to draft policy provisions that are
both consistent with fundamental legal doctrines and with the industry's
economic interests is further frustrated by the fact that courts from different
jurisdictions frequently interpret similar provisions inconsistently. 6 Conse-
quently, the primary industry reaction has been to redraft provisions that
fail judicial review to avoid or rectify pitfalls identified in the litigation and
to merely recast provisions that have not been subjected to legal challenge
to better reflect the industry's ever changing interests. The validity of par-
ticular provision is also suspect until subjected to regulatory action.7 The
insurance industry's haphazard reaction to judicial and legislative action
has, in a few rare instances, led to the development of provisions that have
withstood legal challenge on a national scale. One such provision is the
"step-down" clause.
Step-down clauses are slowly becoming common features in automo-
bile liability policies. They are designed to reduce the level of liability cov-
erage provided in certain situations. Typically, step-down provisions follow
the liability coverage insuring agreement 8 and the omnibus clause, 9 respec-
4 See 19 JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrICE § 10321
(1982); LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGOLLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 22 (3d ed. 1995); Matthew 0.
Trobriner & Joseph R. Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial
State, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1249 (1967).
5 See supra note 2.
6 Conflicting interpretations or opposite conclusions from different jurisdictions regarding the
legal effect or meaning of policy language can give rise to ambiguity. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Wilson, 782 P.2d 727, 732 (Ariz. 1989); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co., 549 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Ark. 1977); Upjohn Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 476 N.W.2d 392, 397 (Mich.
1991); Maddox v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 907, 910 (N.C. 1981); Cimarron Ins.
Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 355 P.2d 742, 746-47 (Or. 1960). But see FDIC v. Am. Cas. Co., 528 N.W.2d
605, 608 (Iowa 1995) (refusing to follow view that an ambiguity arises merely because there is conflict-
ing case authority); Motorist Mut. Ins. Co. v. RSJ, Inc., 926 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that conflicting judicial interpretation is a factor that warrants consideration in assessing the
existence of an ambiguity, but it is in no way dispositive); Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 667 A.2d 617,
624 (Md. 1995) (stating that conflicting judicial interpretation is a factor that warrants consideration in
assessing the existence of an ambiguity, but it is in no way dispositive); Standard Life Ins. Co. v.
Hughes, 315 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tenn. 1958) (recognizing that insurance policies will not be automati-
cally construed against the insurer where judicial construction is clear); Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v.
McKee, 943 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. 1997) (declining to follow view that an ambiguity arises merely
because there is conflicting case authority).
7 See infra note 26.
8 The model automobile liability coverage insuring agreement provides:
Insuring Agreement
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tively.'0 While the language used varies from policy to policy, step-down
provisions generally are drafted using one of two patterns. The first pattern
provides that automobile liability coverage for an insured person, other than
the named insured or a family member, is limited to a specified dollar
amount that is less than that stated in the liability coverage section of the
declaration sheet. 1 The specified dollar amount is usually the minimum
amount of liability coverage required by law.12 The second pattern provides
that automobile liability insurance for an insured party, other than the
named insured or a family member, is limited to an amount not to exceed
the limits of the Financial Responsibility Law of the state in which the ac-
cident occurs.'i Insurance companies seemingly favor the latter approach.' 4
A. We will pay damages for "bodily injury" or "property damage" for which any
"insured" becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident. Damages in-
clude prejudgment interest awarded against the "insured." We will settle or defend,
as we consider appropriate, any claim or suit asking for these damages. In addition
to our limit of liability, we will pay all defense costs we incur. Our duty to settle or
defends ends when our limit of liability for this coverage has been exhausted. We
have no duty to defend any suit or settle any claim for "bodily injury" or "property
damage" not covered in this policy.
INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICES, INC., PERSONAL AUTO POLICY (1985), reprinted in ALLIANCE OF
AMERICAN INSURERS, 1989 PoLICY KIT FOR STUDENTS OF INSURANCE 2-11, at 3 (1989) [hereinafter
PERSONAL AUTO POLICY].
9 "Insured" as defined in the above omnibus clause does not require a determination of whether
someone other than the named insured or a family member had permission to use the covered auto for
purpose of extended coverage. In egregious cases, such as where a permittee was engaged in conversion
or the like, the issue of permission for purposes of the extended coverage under the model omnibus
clause would probably surface. Because of the liberal nature of the model omnibus clause, the majority
of insurance companies have opted to ignore it and instead provide extended coverage to anyone using
the vehicle with the "permission of the named insured." Id.
10 A typical automobile insurance policy provides four types of coverages or protections. Those
protections are: (1) liability coverage; (2) medical payment coverage; (3) uninsured motorist coverage;
and (4) comprehensive and collision coverages. Each coverage contains an insuring agreement which
defines the scope of the protection afforded. Each insuring agreement is in turn followed by an omnibus
clause and exclusion provisions.
It is not uncommon for insurers to define "person insured" or "definition of insureds" or "addi-
tional insureds" differently for purposes of the various coverages. However, insurers are prohibited from
defining the term "insured" or its equivalence in Uninsured Motorist Coverage more restrictively than it
is defined in the omnibus provisions of the Lability Coverage. See, e.g., State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Reaves, 292 So.2d 95 (Ala. 1974); Farmers Ins. Co. v. Schiller, 597 P.2d 238 (Kan. 1979); Pennsyl-
vania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 405 A.2d 779 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979), affid, 416 A.2d
734 (Md. 1980).
11 See, e.g., Balboa Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 496 P.2d 147 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1972); Windsor Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 24 S.W.3d 151, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
12 Windsor, 24 S.W.3d at 154.
13 See, e.g., Brooks v. Bennett, 26 P.3d 73 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (failure to state specific dollar
limit within step-down exclusion does not violate Kansas law); accord Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Haynes,
218 Cal. App. 3d 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters
Ins. Co., 625 N.W.2d 160 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Trantham v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 797 S.W.2d 771
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Lyon, 562 N.W.2d 888 (S.D. 1997). But see Cullum v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d 922 (Utah 1993) (limiting liability to statutory minimum without stating
monetary limits voids step-down provision).
14 See supra note 13.
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Both approaches, however, are industry attempts to comply with compul-
sory automobile or motor vehicle liability insurance statutes and case law.
The vast majority of state legislatures have enacted compulsory auto-
mobile or motor vehicle liability insurance laws. 5 These laws employ ei-
ther one or a combination of two statutory methods to mandate the inclu-
sion of omnibus clauses in every policy of automobile or motor vehicle
insurance. The methods most often employed by state legislatures to man-
date the inclusion of omnibus clauses in liability policies affecting motor
vehicles are Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Statutes (MVSRS) and
Compulsory or Mandatory Liability Statutes (MLS). MVSRS and MLS are
not inconsistent. Consequently, it is not unusual to find both statutes in a
single jurisdiction.' 6 The statutes do, however, serve different purposes and
to some degree complement each other.17 MLS ensure that vehicles are
insured at all times, while MVSRS come into play after an accident has
occurred and create leverage in favor of an individual injured by an unin-
sured driver. Together MLS and MVSRS are designed to plug any holes
that might otherwise exist in compulsory liability insurance law. The vast
majority of jurisdictions, however, have ignored MLS and utilize MVSRS
to require the inclusion of omnibus clauses in motor vehicle liability poli-
cies.18 The statutory language, whether MVSRS or MLS, prescribes only
15 "Currently, 42 states and the District of Columbia require every person registering a motor
vehicle in the state to present a certificate stating that he or she has liability insurance in at least a speci-
fied amount." ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 949 (2d ed. 1999).
Some jurisdictions recognize a legal distinction between "automobile liability policies" and
"motor vehicle liability policies." The former policies are said to be matters of individual choice and
voluntarily purchased. The latter policies, however, are typically required in compliance with Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Statutes and purchased as proof of financial responsibility. Because
"automobile liability policies," unlike "motor vehicle liability policies" are not required to be certified
they are not subject to the requirements of the financial responsibility laws. See, e.g., Gray v. Md. Cas.
Co., 152 F. Supp. 520 (D.C. Ill. 1957); Hearty v. Harris, 574 So.2d 1234 (La. 1991); Perkins v. Perkins,
284 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955); Lewis v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 449 P.2d 679 (Mont. 1968); U.S.
Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Walker, 329 P.2d 852 (Okla. 1958); Novak v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 293
N.W.2d 452 (S.D. 1980).
16 See ARIz. REV. STAT. 28-4009 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999); CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.1 (West
1971 & Supp. 2000); CAL. VEH. CODE § 16451 (West 1971 & Supp. 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 287-
25(2) (1993 & Supp. 1998); id. § 431:1OC-301(a); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-6-103 (2001); id. § 61-6-
301; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 7-324(b)(2) (West 2000); id. § 7-600(1)(b); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-
2204(A) (Michie 1999); id. § 46.2-472 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2001).
17 See JERRY, supra note 15, at 949-5 1.
18 See ALA. CODE § 32-7-22(b)(2) (1999); ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.440(b)(2) (Michie 2001);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-4009(A)(2) (West 1999 & Supp. 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-19-713(b)
(Michie 1994 & Supp. 1999); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 42-7-413(b) (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2902
(1995 & Supp. 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 324.151 (West 2001); IDAHO CODE § 49-1212 (1994); 625
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-317 (West 1993 & Supp. 2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321A.21 (West 1997
& Supp. 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40.3107 (2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:900 (West 1989 &
Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2902-D (West Supp. 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-15-
43(2)(b) (1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 303.190(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. §
485.3091(b) (1997); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 345(b)(2) (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2001); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-279.21(b) (1993 & Cum. Supp. 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-16.1-11 (1997); OHIO REV.
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the minimum amount of liability coverage that must be purchased.' 9 Con-
sequently, an individual seeking automobile liability insurance can procure
an amount in excess of that prescribed by law.
The inclusion of a step-down provision in an automobile liability pol-
icy reduces the amount of liability coverage for a non-relative insured to the
minimum amount required by law.2" This result follows despite the fact that
the named insured purchased liability coverage in excess of the statutorily
required amount. The following example best illustrates the meaning and
effect of a step-down clause.
Assume that Insured purchased $300,000 worth of automobile liability
coverage in a jurisdiction that requires that every vehicle on its roads and
highways be insured to the minimum extent of $20,000 per person and
$40,000 per accident. The jurisdiction also requires that every policy of
automobile liability coverage sold within its boundaries contain an omnibus
clause that extends the liability coverage to anyone driving the insured ve-
hicle with the implied or express permission of the named insured. The
insured vehicle is involved in an accident while being operated by Bill, a
permittee. The accident resulted solely from Bill's negligence. The auto-
mobile liability policy contains a step-down provision that states that, "We
will provide insurance for an insured person, other than you or a family
member, up to $20,000 per person/$40,000 per accident." Despite the fact
that Insured purchased $300,000 of liability coverage, the step-down provi-
sion in effect reduces the amount of coverage allocable to Bill-a permit-
tee-to the minimum amount of liability coverage required by law.
Step-down provisions were developed to prevent permittees-those
driving an insured vehicle with the permission, express or implied, of the
named insured at the time of an accident-from obtaining the broadest pro-
tection afforded by the policy. Thus, a step-down clause furthers the insur-
ance industry's interest in defining the scope of the coverage provided by
the insurance contract. These clauses achieve this function by defining not
who is entitled to coverage under the policy, but by limiting the extent of
CODE ANN. § 4509.51(b) (Anderson 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 806.080 (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-
12-122 (1998 & Supp. 2001); TEx. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 601.076 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2001);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.29.490 (West 2001); W. VA. CODE § 17D-4-12 (1996 & Supp. 1999);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 344.33 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-405(b)(ii) (Michie
1999). But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-303 (1999 & Supp. 2001) (requiring the inclusion of an
omnibus clause in the Liability Insurance Statute).
19 See supra notes 16, 18.
20 Step-down provisions in certain situations can affect the amount of coverage afforded the name
insured and resident family members. For example, step-down language contained in valid household or
family member exclusions totally eliminates the liability coverage afforded a named insured or resident
family member who, while driving the insured vehicle, causes an accident in which a family mem-
ber/passenger is injured. In essence, the named insured becomes an uninsured motorist. See, e.g., Home
Ins. Co. v. McGovern, 837 F. Supp. 661, 669 (E.D. Penn. 1993); Krause v. Krause, 589 N.W.2d 721,
723 (Iowa 1999).
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liability coverage available. In return, the named insured is able to obtain
the desired protection for a lower premium.
This Article examines the development, effect, and validity of step-
down clauses. Part I discusses the drafting history of step-down clauses.
Drafting history is especially important in insurance litigation because most
courts treat it, subject to the parol evidence rule, as admissible.2' Part II
examines the case law and discusses the rationales used by courts in ad-
dressing whether step-down clauses are legal. Part III examines the theories
that have been used to challenge the validity of step-down clauses and con-
siders the residual consequences of a successful challenge to a step-down
provision.
I. DRAFTING HISTORY
Several events influenced the development of step-down provisions.
The first event was the invention of the automobile. Throughout its history,
the automobile has represented a very expensive and risk oriented res. Due
to the nature of automobiles, the insurance industry--once it concluded that
automobiles could be insured profitably-was confronted with the task of
drafting policies consistent with acceptable levels of risk tolerance.2 This
task proved very difficult given that automobiles possess certain inherent
qualities that make them unlike any other insurable property. Automobiles
are expensive consumer goods, mobile, capable of sustaining and causing
injury of enormous proportion, and subject to constant risk of loss. 23
The second event, also influenced by the advent of the automobile,
was the change in judicial and legislative policy regarding the traditional
role of liability insurance.24 Liability insurance was initially designed to
21 See JERRY, supra note 15, at 136-37.
22 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 3, at 385-410 (describing the various mechanisms used by
automobile insurers).
23 These qualities also explain why automobile insurance policies, in terms of terminology, scope
of coverage, and exclusions, tend to be more varied than any other type of insurance. Variations in
automobile insurance policy provisions are so extensive that resolution of automobile insurance disputes
is especially fact sensitive. See Pac. Indem. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 270 Cal. App. 2d 700, 703 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1969); AIG Haw. Ins. Co. v. Vincente, 891 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Haw. 1995); Cameron Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Ward, 599 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Belas v. Melanovich, 372 A.2d 478, 480 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1977).
It has also been observed that when coverage issues arise in automobile insurance, that a num-
ber of factors are important; consequently, it is "relatively difficult to predict with certainty either ex-
actly who will be insureds or under what circumstances persons will be entitled to coverage benefits."
KEETON & WnDtSS, supra note 3, at 386. See also infra note 24.
24 One of the most significant developments of the twentieth century is the widespread owner-
ship and use of automobiles and other vehicles. During roughly the first half of the century, nearly one
million Americans lost their lives in automobile accidents. In 1992, 40,300 people died on the nation's
highways; this large number is actually a substantial decline from the 56,300 highway deaths that oc-
curred in 1972. In 1992, over 5.4 million personal injuries and $98 billion in economic loss were suf-
fered in the 31.8 million auto accidents that occurred in the United States. Because Americans crash
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protect the insured against economic losses that arose out of his legal liabil-
ity for any accidental act. 25 This observation was, and continues to be, true
in the case of automobile insurance. However, insurance regulators,26 as a
result of their perceptions of the societal benefits and interests served by
liability insurance, slowly began to expand and redefine the traditional view
and role of liability insurance to also encompass a victim oriented philoso-
phy. 27 The enactment of compulsory motor vehicle insurance laws rein-
forced and encouraged these perceptions. Compulsory insurance laws, es-
pecially motor vehicle financial responsibility statutes, profoundly altered
the traditional manner in which accident victims are compensated,28 as well
as how courts view automobile liability insurance. 29 There is no doubt that
"[t]he coverage provided by omnibus clauses in liability insurance policies
obviously serves the interests of accident victims."
30
These events-the advent of the automobile and the changing view of
the role of liability coverage-had a profound impact on the development
and application of legal standards used in coverage disputes involving one
their cars into other vehicles, property, and persons so frequently, automobile insurance in many re-
spects has both a history and a set of governing principles of its own. JERRY, supra note 15, at 843; see
also KEETON & WroISS, supra note 3, at 413.
25 KEETON & WlDiss, supra note 3, at 411.
26 The term "regulators" is commonly used in reference to legislatures and administrative agen-
cies exercising power pursuant to legislative authority. This view is quite accurate but equally incom-
plete. "[C]ourts, through the development and application of common law principles in case-by-case
adjudication and by the interpretation and application of state statutes in the course of such adjudication,
also perform a regulatory function." JERRY, supra note 15, at 123.
27 See, e.g., Bass v. Horizon Assurance Co., 562 A.2d 1194, 1196 (Del. 1989); see also JERRY,
supra note 15, at 843-49.
28 See JERRY, supra note 15, at 843-65; KEETON & WiDISs, supra note 3, at 413-17.
29 See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 134 S.E.2d 654 (N.C. 1964). Therein the court
observed:
The primary purpose of compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance is to compen-
sate innocent victims who have been injured by financially irresponsible motorists.
Its purpose is not, like ordinary insurance, to save harmless the tortfeasor himself.
Therefore, there is no reason why the victim's right to recover from the insurance
carrier should depend upon whether the conduct of its insured was intentional or
negligent. In order to accomplish the objective of the law, the perspective here must
be that of the victim and not that of the aggressor for whom the law provides crimi-
nal penalties calculated to minimize any profit he might derive from the insurance.
The victim's rights against the insurer are not derived through the insured as in case
of voluntary insurance. They are statutory and become absolute on the occurrence
of an injury covered by the policy.
Id. at 659. See also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tringali, 686 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1982); Hudson v.
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 1168 (Del. 1990); Martin v. Chicago Ins. Co., 361 S.E.2d 835 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1987); Mosley v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 743 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); Wheeler v.
O'Connell, 9 N.E.2d 544 (Mass. 1937); Cannon v. Commerce Ins. Co., 470 N.E.2d 805 (Mass. App. Ct.
1986); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Wolbarst, 57 A.2d 151 (N.H. 1948); Rosado v. Eveready Ins.
Co., 312 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1974); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Knight, 237 S.E.2d 341 (N.C. Ct. App.
1977); S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mumford, 382 S.E.2d 11 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989); Dotts v.
Taressa J.A., 390 S.E.2d 568 (W. Va. 1990). But see, e.g., Williams v. Diggs, 593 So.2d 385 (La. Ct.
App. 1991).
30 KEETON & WiIss, supra note 3, at 357.
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particular class of omnibus insureds-permittees. Courts, relying on public
policy, struggled to identify principles, theories, and doctrines which would
justify extending omnibus coverage to individuals who, at the time of an
automobile accident, were operating a non-owned insured vehicle in excess
of the permission granted by the named insured.
The events that influenced the development of the step-down clause
must also be considered in the context of overriding principles of insurance
contract interpretation. Most significantly, insurance contracts are inter-
preted like any other contract. 31 In this context, the supreme rule of contract
interpretation to which all other rules are subservient 32 is that "[a]n insur-
ance contract should be construed to carry out the intention of the parties,
and that intention should be ascertained, if possible, from the language in
the policy alone. 33 For purposes of this discussion, however, this principle
31 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hare, 256 So.2d 904, 911 (Ala. Civ. App. 1972); Peterson v. Hudson
Ins. Co., 15 P.2d 249, 251 (Ariz. 1932); Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Crist, 455 S.W.2d 904, 910-11 (Ark. 1970);
Schroeder v. Imperial Ins. Co., 63 P. 1074, 1075 (Cal. 1901); Ballow v. Phico Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 1354,
1368 (Colo. 1993); Peerless Ins. Co. v. Gonzales, 697 A.2d 680, 682 (Conn. 1997); Cont'l Ins. Co. v.
Rosenberg, 74 A. 1073, 1076 (Del. 1909); Boardman Petroleum v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 498 S.E.2d
492, 494 (Ga. 1998); Foote v. Royal Ins. Co., 962 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998); Mut. of
Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wood By-Prods., Inc., 695 P.2d 409, 413 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984); Ins. Co. v.
Adkisson, 459 N.E.2d 310, 314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Homes Ins. Co., 482 N.E.2d 467,
470 (Ind. 1985); Kantor v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 258 N.W. 759, 760 (Iowa 1935); Smith v. Matthews, 611
So.2d 1377, 1379 (La. 1993); Kendall v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 702 A.2d 767, 770-71 (Md. 1997);
Kirkpatrick v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 473 N.E.2d 173, 179 (Mass. 1985); Barry v. Boston Marine
Ins. Co., 29 N.W. 31, 31 (Mich. 1886); Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Bouldin, 56 So. 609, 613 (Miss.
1911); Howard v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 145 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Mo. 1940); Century Corp. v. Phoenix of
Hartford, 482 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Mont. 1971); Kast v. American-Amicable Life Ins. Co., 559 N.W.2d
460, 464 (Neb. 1997); Chavis v. S. Life Ins. Co., 347 S.E.2d 425, 427 (N.C. 1986); Dealers Dairy
Prods. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 164 N.E.2d 745, 747 (Ohio 1960); Shawnee Fire Ins. Co. v. Thompson &
Rowell, 119 P. 985, 988 (Okla. 1911); Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d
563, 566 (Pa. 1983); Ormsby v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 58 N.W. 301, 304 (S.D. 1894); Am. Nat'l Prop. &
Cas. Co. v. Gray, 803 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, 875
S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex. 1994); Cannon v. Travelers Indem. Co., 994 P.2d 824, 827 (Utah Ct. App.
2000); Brown v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 211 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Wis. 1973).
32 13 APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 4, at § 7385.
33 Wheeler v. Allstate Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 9, 10 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); see also Hall v. Am. Indem.
Group, 648 So.2d 556, 559 (Ala. 1994); Home Indem. Co. v. Wilson, 489 P.2d 244, 247 (Ariz. 1971);
Floyd v. Otter Creek Homeowners Ass'n, 742 S.W.2d 120, 123 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988); Bay Cities Paving
& Grading, Inc. v. Lawyer's Mut. Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1263, 1271 (Cal. 1993); Hitz v. Allied Am. Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 195 A.2d 446, 448 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1963); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 686 A.2d 152, 155-56 (Del. 1996); State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deni Assoc., Inc., 678 So.2d
397, 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Luzar v. W. Sur. Co., 692 P.2d 337, 341 (Idaho 1984); Willison v.
Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 690 N.E.2d 1073, 1075 (111. App. Ct. 1998); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 504
N.E.2d 1030, 1032 (hid. Ct. App. 1987), vacated, 517 N.E.2d 386 (Ind. 1988); Loyd v. Fed. Kemper
Life Assurance Co., 518 N.W.2d 374, 375 (Iowa 1994); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Old Hickory Cas.
Ins. Co., 810 P.2d 283, 286 (Kan. 1991); Benton v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc., 550 So.2d 859, 860 (La. Ct.
App. 1989); Maine Drilling & Blasting, Inc. v. Ins. Co., 665 A.2d 671, 675 (Me. 1995); JMP Assoc.,
Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 693 A.2d 832, 834 (Md. 1997); W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. U.S.
Fire Ins. Co., 269 N.W.2d 34, 36 (Minn. 1978); Peterson v. Cont'l Boiler Works, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 896,
901 (Mo. 1990); Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Bierschenk, 548 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Neb. 1996); Caruso v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 57 A.2d 359, 360 (N.J. 1948); Loya v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 888
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of interpretation must also be considered in the context of the pertinent lan-
guage contained in the liability coverage omnibus clause. That language,
which has been variously stated, usually defines additional insureds to in-
clude "any person using your covered vehicle with your permission."34
The insurance industry has extensive experience with disputes involv-
ing extended omnibus clause coverage. 35 These disputes are factually
unique, and, in a significantly disproportionate number of instances, the
named insured denied that permission to operate the insured vehicle had
been granted or otherwise supported the insurer in its denial of extended
coverage. 36 Despite this, the issues involved in extended omnibus coverage
disputes usually concern: (1) whether permission to operate the insured
vehicle existed for purposes of omnibus coverage; or (2) whether omnibus
coverage extends to situations where the permittee exceeded the scope of
the permission granted either in terms of purpose or time.37
Judicial reaction to litigation regarding extended omnibus coverage
has taken the shape of a number of imprecise legal standards that, in vary-
ing degrees, reflect a victim-oriented philosophy. These legal standards are
as diverse and eclectic as the factual contexts in which the issue of ex-
tended omnibus coverage arise. Still, they are useful to explain the holding
in the vast majority of cases. These standards can be classified as: (1) the
liberal or "initial permission" rule;38 (2) the moderate or "minor deviation"
rule;39 (3) the strict or "conversion" rule;4° (4) the broad statutory ap-
P.2d 447, 451 (N.M. 1994); Hickman v. Saunders, 645 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (N.Y. 1996); Employers Rein-
surance Corp. v. Landmark, 547 N.W.2d 527, 532 (N.D. 1996).
34 See supra note 9.
35 See infra notes 38-43.
36 See infra notes 38-43.
37 See infra notes 38-43.
38 This rule provides that if a person has permission to use an automobile in the first instance, any
subsequent use while it remains in her possession though not within the contemplation of the parties is a
permissive use within the terms of the omnibus clause. The only limitation on this rule is that the subse-
quent use must not be equivalent to theft or the like. States that adhere to this view include Arkansas,
see, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 745 S.W.2d 589 (Ark. 1988); California, see, e.g.,
Jordan v. Consol. Mut. Ins. Co., 130 Cal. Rptr. 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Florida, see, e.g., Susco Car
Rental Sys. v. Leonard, 112 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1959); Illinois, see, e.g., Visintin v. Country Mut. Ins. Co.,
222 N.E.2d 550 (11. App. Ct. 1966); Indiana, see, e.g., Hartford Ins. Co. v. Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.,
485 N.E.2d 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Louisiana, see, e.g., Carey v. Ory, 421 So.2d 1003 (La. Ct. App.
1982); Minnesota, see, e.g., Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160 (Minn.
1983); Montana, see, e.g., Cascade Ins. Co. v. Glacier Gen. Ins. Co., 479 P.2d 259 (Mont. 1971); Ne-
braska, see, e.g., Barry v. Tanner, 547 N.W.2d 730 (Neb. 1996); Nevada, see, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. Fisher, 494 P.2d 549 (Nev. 1972); New Hampshire, see, e.g., GEICO v. Johnson, 396 A.2d 331
(N.H. 1978); New Jersey, see, e.g., Rutgers Cas. Ins. v. Collins, 730 A.2d 833 (N.J. 1999); New Mex-
ico, see, e.g., Kitchens v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 896 P.2d 479 (N.M. 1995); Oregon, see, e.g., Ryan v.
W. Pac. Ins. Co., 408 P.2d 84 (Or. 1965); Tennessee, see, e.g., Estate of Adkins v. White Consol. In-
dus., 788 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); and West Virginia, see, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins.
Co. v. Taylor, 408 S.E.2d 358 (W. Va. 1991).
39 The minor deviation rule provides that a permittee is covered under the omnibus clause so long
as her deviation from the permissive use is minor in nature. States that adhere to this view include
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proach;4 1 (5) the presumption of permission approach;42 and (6) the con-
tract-by-contract approach.43
The insurance industry initially responded to these standards by substi-
tuting the phrase "within the scope of such permission" for the phrase "with
your permission," used in earlier policies." This, however, did little to stem
the tide in favor of extending omnibus coverage to permittees. Rather,
courts continued, in all but the most factually egregious cases, to adhere to
the view that an insurance company could not avoid liability by claiming
that a motorist's use of the insured's automobile exceeded the scope of au-
thority granted by the insured.45
Industry efforts to stem the tide of judicial decisions in favor of ex-
panded omnibus coverage by changing the pertinent policy language
proved unsuccessful for the most part. This failure was largely due to the
prevalence of mandatory omnibus clause statutes that were construed by
courts to manifest a strong public policy in favor of providing compensa-
tion to accident victims.46 These same statutes, however, would ultimately
prove useful in later industry efforts to limit liability exposure.
Arizona, see, e.g., James v. Aetna Life & Cas., 546 P.2d 1146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); Delaware, see,
e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 437 A.2d 165 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981); Kansas,
see, e.g., Cimarron Ins. Co. v. Loftus, 612 P.2d 1245 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980); Kentucky, see, e.g., Md.
Cas. Co. v. Hassell, 426 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1967); Mississippi, see, e.g., Wade v. Bonner, 409 So.2d
1333 (Miss. 1982); North Carolina, see, e.g., Packer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 221 S.E.2d 707 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1976); Ohio, see, e.g., Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Selz, 451 N.E.2d 1203 (Ohio 1983); Okla-
homa, see, e.g., Higgins v. Ridenhour, No. 50,819, 1978 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 112 (Ct. App. Feb. 28,
1978); South Dakota, see, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ragatz, 571 N.W.2d 155 (S.D. 1997);
Texas, see, e.g., Coronado v. Employers Nat'l Ins. Co., 596 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1979); Washington, see,
e.g., Eshelman v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 442 P.2d 964 (Wash. 1968); and Wisconsin, see, e.g., Employers
Ins. v. Pelczynski, 451 N.W.2d 300 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
40 The strict or "conversion" rule provides that any deviation from the time, place, or purpose
specified by the person granting permission is sufficient to take the permittee outside the coverage of
the omnibus clause. States adhering to this view include Maine, see, e.g., Johnson v. Am. Auto. Ins.
Co., 161 A. 496 (Me. 1932); and Michigan, see, e.g., Gray v. Sawatzki, 289 N.W. 227 (Mich. 1939).
41 The broad statutory approach allows courts to liberally construe the omnibus clause to provide
coverage. One state that expressly follows this approach is Alaska. See, e.g., Johnson v. U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Co., 601 P.2d 260 (Alaska 1979).
42 The presumption of permission provides that permission will be presumed. However, the party
asserting that permission did not exist may rebut the presumption. States that adhere to this view include
Hawaii and Vermont. See, e.g., AIG Haw. Ins. Co. v. Vincente, 891 P.2d 1041 (Haw. 1995); Am. Fid.
Co. v. N. British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 204 A.2d 110 (Vt. 1964). But see Columbia Cas. Co. v. Hoo-
huli, 437 P.2d 99 (Haw. 1968) (applying initial permission rule).
43 States that have adopted the contract-by-contract basis recognize that the terminology em-
ployed in omnibus clauses vary to such a degree that extended coverage should be determined on a
policy-by-policy basis. Maryland adheres to this view. See, e.g., Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pinkney,
399 A.2d 877 (Md. 1979).
44 KEETON & Wmtss, supra note 3, at 362 (1988).
45 See, e.g., Selected Risk Ins. Co. v. Zullo, 225 A.2d 570 (N.J. 1966).
46 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 3, at 357.
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II. DECISIONAL LAW
As noted earlier, insurance companies enjoy the same rights as others
to limit their liability and impose whatever conditions they please upon
their obligation to insure, as long as the exercise of the right to freely con-
tract does not violate public policy.47 Thus, in the absence of a violation of
public policy, an insurance contract, like any other contract, should be en-
forced according to its terms.4 8 Consequently, the relevant question regard-
ing step-down provisions is whether a two-tier policy not expressly author-
ized by law is legal. The answer to this question, in the absence of legisla-
tion to the contrary, depends entirely upon some cogent argument that the
owner of a vehicle should be precluded from insuring itself against liability
at a higher limit than the limit it provides for permissive users.
The vast majority of courts recognize that two-tier or step-down cov-
erage is not per se illegal. 49 These courts have generally relied on a combi-
nation of two rationales: (1) the right of the parties to freely contract; and
47 See supra note 2.
48 See Criterion Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 347 So.2d 384 (Ala. 1977); Gristy v. Hudgens, 203 P. 569
(Ariz. 1922); Watts v. Life Ins. Co., 782 S.W.2d 47 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Freder-
ick, 244 Cal. App. 2d 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); Terranova v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 800 P.2d
58 (Colo. 1990); Redmond v. State Farm Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 1202 (D.C. Ct. App. 1999); Hagen v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 675 So.2d 963 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Foote v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 962 P.2d
1004 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Villicana, 692 N.E.2d 1196 (Ill. 1998);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Bradtmueller, 715 N.E.2d 993 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Steinle v. Knowles, 961 P.2d
1228 (Kan. 1998); Etienne v. Nat'l Auto. Ins. Co., 759 So.2d 51 (La. 2000); Heniser v. Frankenmuth
Mut. Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 502 (Mich. 1995); Gunn v. Principal Cas. Ins. Co., 605 So.2d 741 (Miss.
1992); Schoettger v. Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Co., 10 S.W.3d 566 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); Youngblood v.
Am. States Ins. Co., 866 P.2d 203 (Mont. 1993); Lonsdale v. Union Ins. Co., 91 N.W.2d 245 (Neb.
1958); Rao v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 549 A.2d 1259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988); Stin-
brink v. Farmers Ins. Co., 803 P.2d 664 (N.M. 1990); Axelroad v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 196 N.E. 388
(N.Y. 1935); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 152 S.E.2d 436 (N.C. 1967); Motorists Ins. Co.
v. BFI Waste Mgmt., 728 N.E.2d 31 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999); Nat'l Aid Life Ass'n v. May, 207 P.2d 292
(Okla. 1949); Kingman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 134 S.E.2d 217 (S.C. 1964); Leete v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 288 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 687 P.2d 1139
(Wash. 1984); Sinclair Oil Co. v. Republic Ins. Co., 929 P.2d 535 (Wyo. 1996).
49 See Balboa Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 496 P.2d 147, 149 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1972); Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Haynes, 218 Cal. App. 3d 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Patton v. Lindo's
Rent-A-Car, Inc., 415 So.2d 43, 45 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982); Harden v. Monroe Guar. Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d
814 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Krause v. Krause, 589 N.W.2d 721 (Iowa 1999); Lindsey v. Colonial Lloyd's
Ins. Co., 595 So.2d 606 (La. 1992); Bowers v. Estate of Feathers, 671 A.2d 695 (Pa. Super. 1995); Rao,
549 A.2d 1259; Yosemite Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 653 P.2d 149 (Nev. 1982); Gen. Acci-
dent Group of Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 468 A.2d 430, 433 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1983);
Radin v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 604 N.Y.S.2d 662 (N.Y. 1993); Am. Tours, Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 338 S.E.2d 92, 98 (N.C. 1986); Windsor Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 24 S.W.3d 151 (Mo. 2000); Uni-
versal Underwriters Ins. v. Metro. Prop. & Life Ins. Co., 380 S.E.2d 858 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989); Am.
Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 927 P.2d 186 (Utah 1996) (construing Idaho law); Cullum v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d 922 (Utah 1993). See also U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Barker Car Rental, 944 F.
Supp. 739 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (predicting that step-down clauses do not violate the public policy of Indiana
or Illinois); Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Lyon, 562 N.W.2d 888 (S.D. 1997) (holding step-down provision
violated statute).
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(2) compliance with the minimum limits of coverage required by law.5 0
Courts have manifested a predisposition to take judicial notice of the in-
creasing cost of liability insurance with respect to the first rationale.5' Con-
sequently, negotiations directed at obtaining a lower premium because of
the exclusion of a high risk, which do not result in a provision in contraven-
tion of public policy, constitute a legitimate interest.5 2 Considered in con-
junction with the fact that the vast majority of states have enacted compre-
hensive compulsory motor vehicle laws, it is not surprising that courts have
deferred to legislative mandates as embodiments of public policy. There-
fore, step-down provisions, in all but two jurisdictions,53 do not violate pub-
lic policy as long as they provide the minimum limits of coverage required
by law. "If the minimum limits provided by law are inadequate, that is a
matter [for] the legislature. '5 4
Significant implications flow out of the fact that step-down provisions
are not per se violations of public policy. First, the clauses are not totally
immune from legal challenges on other grounds. Most challenges to the
validity of step-down provisions are asserted as one or a combination of
three theories. These theories are that the clause is invalid because it: (1)
does not comply with statutory requirements other than providing the
minimum limits of coverage;55 (2) violates the reasonable expectation of
the parties;56 and (3) is ambiguous either because of the language used or
organization of the policy.57
A. Violation of Statutory Requirements Other Than Providing the Mini-
mum Limits of Coverage
Even in jurisdictions in which step-down clauses are not per se illegal
because they provide the minimum level of statutory coverage, two-tiered
coverage may be challenged for violating other statutory mandates. Statutes
frequently dictate what provisions a motor vehicle liability insurance policy
must contain.58 However, it is not uncommon for statutes to prescribe the
50 See, e.g., Balboa, 496 P.2d at 149; Patton, 415 So.2d at 45; Gen. Accident Group, 468 A.2d at
433; Am. Tours, 338 S.E.2d at 98; Windsor, 24 S.W.3d at 153.
51 See, e.g., Bowers, 671 A.2d at 699. Gerald L. Walter, Jr., Note, 21 LA. L. REv. 835, 836 (1961)
("[Clertain limitations are imposed for the purpose of enabling the insurer to set premiums which will
not make the cost of such a policy prohibitive.").
52 See, e.g., N.Y. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 456 P.2d 914 (Ariz. 1969); Equity
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Spring Valley Wholesale Nursery, Inc., 747 P.2d 947 (Okla. 1987); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042, 1044 (Utah 1987).
53 See Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Co., 188 S.E.2d 218 (Va.
1972); Smith v. Nat'l Indem. Co., 205 N.W.2d 365 (Wis. 1973).
54 Gen. Accident Group, 468 A.2d at 433.
55 See discussion infra Part II.A.
56 See discussion infra Part Il.B.
57 See discussion infra Part II.C.
58 See supra notes 16, 18.
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method in which insurance policies must be drafted.59 Consequently, chal-
lenges based on violations of other statutory requirements can be classified
into disputes involving contract form as well as contract substance.
Cullum v. Farmers Insurance Exchange60 and Mid-Century Insurance
Co. v. Lyons61 are excellent examples of challenges based on form or fail-
ures to follow statutorily prescribed drafting protocol. In Cullum, the plain-
tiffs were injured when a car driven by Richard Smith struck the motorcy-
cle on which they were riding.62 Smith was driving the car with the permis-
sion of the daughter of the named insured-Melvin Fish.63 Farmers Insur-
ance Exchange insured the car and was the defendant in the case. 6 The
policy provided liability coverage up to $50,000 per person or $100,000 per
accident. 65 It also contained a step-down clause which stated: "We will
provide insurance for an insured person, other than you or a family mem-
ber, up to the limits of the Financial Responsibility Law only."66 Richard
Smith was not a family member of Mr. Fish's household.67
Plaintiffs sought to recover from the insurer. However, Farmers Insur-
ance Exchange refused to pay more than $40,000-the minimum per acci-
dent limit required by law at the time.68 Plaintiffs subsequently filed an
action for declaratory relief seeking to recover $100,000-the full amount
of liability coverage provided by the policy. 69 The trial court, in response to
motions for summary judgment from both parties, granted the defendant's
motion and held that the "[d]efendant ... has no further obligation to the
Plaintiffs to provide coverage for sums under its policy in excess of...
$20,000 per person. 7° Plaintiffs appealed.7'
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the step-down clause (1) violated
section A-22-303 of the Utah Insurance Code, which permits an insurer to
provide step-down coverage only in certain circumstances; (2) violated
section A-21-106, which directs that an insurance company may not incor-
porate any provision by reference; and (3) is ambiguous and should there-
fore be construed against the insurer.72 The court, relying on the language
of section A-22-303, concluded "that the legislature did not intend to limit
59 See discussion supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
60 857 P.2d 922 (Utah 1993).
61 562 N.W.2d 888 (S.D. 1997).
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step-down coverage" to specific types of insureds. 73 Hence, the court re-
jected the plaintiffs' argument based upon section A-22-303 and held "that
the statute does not prohibit insurers from providing step-down coverage
for permissive users, as long as the coverage satisfies the statutory mini-
mums . ... 74
The plaintiffs contended in their second argument that the reference in
the step-down clause to "the limits of the Financial Responsibility Law"
violated section A-21-106 of the Utah Insurance Code, which prohibits
incorporation of provisions not appearing in the insurance policy or in at-
tached documents. Section A-21-106(1) provides: [a]n insurance policy
may not contain any agreement or incorporate any provision not fully set
forth in the policy or in an application or other document attached to and
made a part of the policy at the time of its delivery .... 7' The Cullum court,
after rejecting the merits of defendants' arguments for the use of the phrase
"the limits of the Financial Responsibility Law," observed that the policy
limited the coverage provided to permissive users but failed to identify the
limits.7 6 Thus, reference to undefined "limits of the Financial Responsibility
Law" constituted an incorporation of coverage from an outside source,77
which blatantly violated the statutory language and purpose of section A-
21-106.78
The court in Cullum clearly articulated that the phrase "the limits of
the Financial Responsibility Law" did not pose a problem of contract inter-
pretation because section A-21-106 addresses "the method of drafting in-
surance contracts., 79 "It directs that all provisions must be physically pre-
sent in the written contract itself or in other documents attached to the con-
tract at time of delivery. '80 According to the court, the purpose of the stat-
ute:
is to insure that the entire insurance contract is contained in one document so that the insured
can determine from the policy exactly what coverage he or she has..... This goal would be
defeated by allowing incorporation of substantive statutory provisions just as it would by al-
lowing incorporation of other written materials. 8 1
Mid-Century Insurance Co. v. Lyons82 illustrates a challenge to a step-
down clause based on a failure to follow drafting protocol from an entirely
different perspective than in Cullum. In Mid-Century, Carl Benedict was
73 Id. at 924.
74 Id.
75 UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-06 (2001).






82 562 N.W.2d 888 (S.D. 1997).
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driving a car with the permission of its owner when he collided with Re-
becca Waack.83 Benedict's negligence caused the collision.' The vehicle
was insured by Mid-Century Insurance Company.85 The Mid-Century pol-
icy carried a bodily injury liability limit of $50,000 per person and
$100,000 per accident.86 The policy also contained a step-down provision
that limited the insurer's liability to the "requirements of the South Dakota
Financial Responsibility Law" 87 -set at $25,000. Consequently, Mid-
Century contended that it was only obligated to provide $25,000 of cover-
age in this instance.88
The South Dakota Division of Insurance was contacted regarding the
validity of the step-down provision.89 It ruled that the clause was invalid
because it constituted a restrictive endorsement that was required to be on a
separate page attached to, rather than part of, the policy itself.9" This ruling
was ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court of South Dakota for final
disposition.9'
The Division of Insurance relied on the language of section 11-9.3 of
the South Dakota Insurance Code. That statute provides that:
An insurance policy covering a private passenger automobile or other motor vehicle regis-
tered or principally garaged in this state may by written agreement with the named insured
exclude a named individual from coverage. The policy may also contain a restrictive en-
dorsement reducing the limits of liability or collision coverage when the vehicle is operated
by a named person or class of persons. However, if the policy does not provide liability cov-
erage to a person or persons named in the restrictive endorsement, the liability coverage may
not be less than the minimum prescribed by chapter 32-35.92
On appeal, the Division of Insurance argued that the legislature, when it
failed to define the term "restrictive endorsement" in the statute, contem-
plated that the term would be accorded its common industry meaning.93
Consequently, because the step-down provision constituted a restrictive
endorsement, it had to be placed on a separate page or piece of paper apart
from the body of the policy. 94
The court agreed that in the absence of a statutory definition, "restric-
tive endorsement" should be construed to convey its ordinary popular








91 Id. at 890.
92 Id. at 889.
93 Id. at 890.
94 Id.
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meaning. 95 Relying upon legal treatises and encyclopedias, the court con-
cluded that "endorsements of any type in an insurance context are attached
to policies and are not part of the policy proper."96 The court further found
this definition to be consistent with the legislative intent and purpose of the
statute.
97
Cullum and Mid-Century demonstrate that challenges to step-down
provisions based on failures to follow drafting protocol can result from one
of two perspectives. The first perspective, illustrated by Cullum, occurs
when the step-down provision contained in the policy does not contain in-
formation sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements. The second per-
spective, illustrated by Mid-Century, results when the policy itself contains
a step-down provision that is statutorily required to be separately stated and
attached to the policy.
Challenges to the validity of step-down provisions can also be based
upon substantive violations of compulsory automobile statutes other than
the minimum limits of coverage requirement. These violations usually oc-
cur when insurers place conditions on the statutory limits of coverage.
Unlike in Cullum and Mid-Century, resolution of the issue in this context
involves principles of contract interpretation. 98
For example, in Rao v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co.,99 Anita
Rao, while driving a vehicle leased by her husband, struck Lena Paglucci, a
pedestrian.'0° The vehicle had been leased by Mr. Rao from Open Road
Leasing. °1 The lease agreement required Mr. Rao to obtain liability insur-
ance on the vehicle. 10 2 A policy was obtained by Mr. Rao from Allstate
Insurance and provided coverage in the amount of $100,000/$300,000.103
The policy also named Open Road as an additional insured.' °4 Allstate de-
posited the proceeds of this policy with the court.0 5
Open Road also had an automobile liability insurance policy that it
purchased from Universal Insurance Underwriters.0 6 This policy contained
a step-down provision that conditioned coverage up to the statutorily re-
quired minimum on the lessee's failure to secure sufficient liability insur-
95 Id. at 891.
96 Id. at 890.97 Id. at 892.
98 See, e.g., Rao v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 549 A.2d 1259, 1260 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1988) ("[T]he parties agree ... that the issue is a legal one involving the interpretation of an insur-
ance contract .... ).
99 549 A.2d 1259.
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ance to comply with the statutory mandate.' °7 Essentially, while the Uni-
versal policy provided higher amounts of coverage for vehicles operated by
Open Road's employees, a lessee was provided coverage only to the extent
of the statutory minimums, and that coverage arose only if the lessee failed
to procure sufficient liability coverage to satisfy the statutory minimums.10 8
In essence, the step-down provision in Universal's policy contained a con-
tingency upon which the statutorily required coverage was conditioned.
The court in Rao reviewed the New Jersey Safety Responsibility
Law."° Following a careful examination of the language, purpose, and in-
tent of the statute, the court concluded that the statute "insures that a lessor
will provide such insurance coverage irrespective of whether a lessee does
so."110 Consequently, any provision that attempts to preclude coverage en-
tirely based on an agreement with a lessee is contrary to the law and consti-
tutes an illegal escape clause.' 1
In challenges based on statutory violations other than the minimum
limits of coverage, ascertainment of the legislative intent and purpose of a
statute serves two functions. It is initially used to determine whether a vio-
lation has occurred and correspondingly whether the step-down provision is
enforceable. If the court concludes that the provision is unenforceable be-
cause it violates a statutory mandate, these considerations are subsequently
used to determine whether an exception to the statute should be recog-
nized.1 12 In the event the statute violated is construed to manifest a strong
policy, an exception to the statutory requirement should not be recog-
nized. 113
B. Reasonable Expectations Doctrine
The reasonable expectations doctrine is a recent development in the
law of insurance.1 4 The doctrine is used to describe a combination of equi-
table principles and has proven useful in explaining the results of disparate
insurance law decisions that appear to be based on a number of different
rationales.'15 Since the intellectual foundations of the doctrine were first
laid down, courts throughout the country have attempted to shape these
varied principles into definitive rules through decisional law. This effort
107 Id.
108 Id. at 1262.
109 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:21-1 (West 1995).
110 Id.
II Id. at 1263.
112 See, e.g., Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d 922, 925 (1993).
113 See, e.g., id. at 922; Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Lyon, 562 N.W.2d 888, 888 (S.D. 1997).
114 Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two
Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 825 (1990) (citing Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance
with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970)).
115 Id.
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has only increased the uncertainty regarding the theoretical underpinnings,
scope, and details of application of the doctrine. It has, however, culmi-
nated in the development and recognition of different versions of the doc-
trine l1 6
One commentator classified these versions and the rules applicable
thereto as: (1) construction of an ambiguous term in the insurance contract
to satisfy the insured's reasonable expectations; (2) refusal to enforce the
"fine print" of an insurance contract because it limits more prominent pro-
visions giving rise to the insured's expectations; and (3) refusal to enforce
an insurance contract provision when it would frustrate the reasonable ex-
pectations of coverage created by the insurer outside of the contract.117
These versions of the doctrine can be further refined. Decisional law sug-
gests that versions (1) and (2) are merely variants of the doctrine of ambi-
guity and are not separate approaches to which entirely distinct rules are
applicable."' Version (3) is distinguishable because, at least in terms of
application, it reflects kinship to the doctrines of estoppel and unconscion-
ability.119 The existence of multiple versions of the doctrine of reasonable
expectations does not change the fact that only two competing decisional
approaches to interpreting insurance contracts have developed. These inter-
pretive methods have been articulated as the "traditional" or "formalist"
approach and the "functional" or "reasonable expectations" approach. 120
116 Id. at 838; see also Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L.
REv. 323, 345, 370-71 (1986).
117 Stephen J. Ware, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1461, 1467 (1989).
118 See infra Part IIL.C.
119 For a discussion of estoppel and unconscionability in the context of insurance, see Johnny
Parker, Replacement Cost Coverage: A Legal Primer, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 295, 323-328 (1999).
120 Collins v. Farmers Ins. Co., 822 P.2d 1146, 1159 (Or. 1991) (Unis, J., dissenting). Justice Unis
explained the similarities and distinctions between the interpretative approaches as:
Under the "traditional" or "formalist" approach, the court looks to the "four cor-
ners" of the insurance policy and interprets it by applying rules applicable to all
contracts in general. The insured is held to have read and to have understood the
clear language of the policy. Extrinsic evidence relating to the insurance contract
may be examined for the purpose of determining the parties' intentions to an objec-
tive analysis of the "four corners" of the contract.
The rationale behind the "formalist" approach is that contracts of insurance rest
upon and are controlled by the same principles of law that apply to other contracts,
and the parties to an insurance contract may provide such provisions as they deem
proper as long as the contract does not contravene law or public policy.
The competing approach to insurance contract interpretation-the "functional" or
"reasonable expectation" approach-is that the policyholder's reasonable expecta-
tions to coverage under the insurance policy should be honored even though those
expectations vary from the policy provisions.
The "functional" or "reasonable expectation" approach is supported by the no-
tion that insurance contracts are not ordinary contracts negotiated by parties with
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Despite the uncertainty that remains regarding the scope and details of
application of the reasonable expectations doctrine, some generally ac-
cepted definitive rules have evolved with regard to each version. A majority
of jurisdictions adhere to a narrow version of the doctrine, treating the doc-
trine as a corollary to the rule of ambiguity. 121 Pursuant to the narrow ver-
sion, the doctrine is treated as a tool of contract interpretation and is appli-
cable only if an ambiguity exists in the policy.122 Consequently, the narrow
version would honor objectively reasonable expectations of the insured
even though painstaking study of the policy provisions have negated those
expectations when: (1) the policy is ambiguous; (2) the policy contains
exclusions that are masked by technical or obscure language; or (3) exclu-
roughly equal bargaining strength. Rather, they are largely contracts of adhesion,
where the insurance company, in preparing a standardized printed form, has the su-
perior bargaining position, and the insured has to accept such policy on a "take-it-
or-leave-it" basis if the insured wants any form of insurance protection....
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §211 (1981), "[r]epudiates the 'four-corners'
['traditional' or 'formalist'] approach to contract interpretation in the standardized
agreement setting and in effect approves a doctrine of 'reasonable expectations.'
A growing number of courts use the "functional" approach to protect the "rea-
sonable expectations" of the insured policyholder from possible denial of coverage
that might result under the "traditional" or "formalist" contractual analysis of an in-
surance policy.
There is no disagreement between the "formalist" and the "functional" ap-
proaches whenever the insurance policy is ambiguous or susceptible to two or more
reasonable interpretations.
Id. at 1159-61 (citations omitted).
121 See, e.g., Morris v. Atlas Assurance Co., 204 Cal. Rptr. 95, 100 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Derrick-
son v. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 538 A.2d 1113 (Del. 1988); Penalosa Co-op. Exch. v. Farmland
Mut. Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990); Simon v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 210,
212-13 (Ky. 1986); La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 630 So.2d 759, 764 (La. 1994);
Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 475 N.W.2d 48, 52 (Mich. 1991); Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442
N.W.2d 308, 311-12 (Minn. 1989); Rodriguez v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo.
1991); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Young, 832 P.2d 376, 379 (Nev. 1992); Max True Plastering Co. v. U.S.
Fid. & Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 863 (Okla. 1996); Jefferson Ins. Co. v. City of Holyoke, 503 N.E.2d
474, 478 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (courts are split on whether application of reasonable expectations
doctrine requires ambiguity). But see Sharpe v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 94-2262C, 1996 LEXIS 441
(Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 29, 1996) (holding ambiguity must exist in order to apply reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine); Rummel v. Lexington Ins. Co., 945 P.2d 970, 977 (N.M. 1997); Employers Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Pires, 723 A.2d 295, 297-98 (R.I. 1999); State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 687 P.2d 1139,
1144 (Wash. 1984); Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 509 S.E.2d 1, 14 (W. Va. 1998); Kremers-
Urban Co. v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 351 N.W.2d 156, 163 (Wis. 1984). See also Mills v. Agrichemi-
cal Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663, 671-73 (N.D. 1977) (a majority of courts have not adopted the
reasonable expectations doctrine; however, North Dakota law does recognize the doctrine of adhesion
contract which has the same practical effect as the narrow version of the reasonable expectations doc-
trine).
122 See sources cited supra note 121.
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sions are hidden in policy provisions.'23 Any of these circumstances, in
isolation or combination, would support a finding of a latent or patent am-
biguity. 24 The narrow version of the reasonable expectations doctrine is in
keeping with the "traditional" or "formalist" approach to contract interpre-
tation.' 25
The broad version of the doctrine, which is consistent with the "func-
tional" or "reasonable expectations" approach, permits application of the
doctrine even in the absence of a finding of ambiguity. 126 Furthermore,
unlike the narrow version, 127 the broad version permits application of the
doctrine based solely upon the fact that an insurance policy is a contract of
adhesion.128 Pursuant to the broad version, courts are justified in rewriting
123 See sources cited supra note 121.
124 Patent and latent ambiguities may both arise from the language used in an insurance policy.
See C. & A. Constr. Co. v. Benning Constr. Co., 509 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Ark. 1974); N. Am. Philips
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 88C-JA-155, 1995 Del. Super. LEXIS 356, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct.
Mar. 10, 1995); Hall v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 295 N.W. 204, 206 (Mich. 1940); Koplin v.
Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 44 A.2d 877, 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1945); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus.,
Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995).
A patent ambiguity exists when the language on its face is capable of more than a single inter-
pretation and arises from the use of defective or obscure, or insensible language. Crown Mgmt. Corp. v.
Goodman, 452 So.2d 49, 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ("Extrinsic evidence is inadmissible if the ambi-
guity is patent, because such evidence would, in effect, allow the court to rewrite the contract for the
parties by supplying information the parties themselves did not choose to include."). A latent ambiguity
exists when patently unambiguous language becomes ambiguous when applied. Ma ("A latent ambiguity
... is said to exist where a contract fails to specify the rights or duties of the parties in certain situations
and extrinsic evidence is necessary for interpretation or a choice between two possible meanings.").
Although there appears to be some divergence of opinion as to when parol evidence
is properly admitted because of the latent ambiguity-patent ambiguity dichotomy,
the distinction between the type of ambiguity involved is one of form over sub-
stance. The growing and better reasoned trend of authority indicates that the intro-
duction of parol evidence to probe the true intent of the parties is proper, irrespec-
tive of any technical classification of the type of ambiguity present.
Id.
125 See supra note 119.
126 A number of jurisdictions have concluded that the reasonable expectations doctrine may be
applied in the absence of ambiguity. See, e.g., Maynard v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 902 P.2d 1328,
1330 (Alaska 1995); Amoco Oil v. Erin, 908 P.2d 493,498 (Colo. 1995); Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v.
Brooks, 686 P.2d 23, 27 (Haw. 1984); Corgatelli v. Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 737, 741
(Idaho 1975); Clarke-Peterson v. Indep. Ins. Assoc., Ltd., 492 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Iowa 1992); W. Truck-
ing Line, Inc. v. Northland Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 262, 264-65 (Iowa 1990); Lindstrom v. Hanover Ins.
Co., 649 A.2d 1272, 1276 (N.J. 1994).
Some jurisdictions have expressly rejected the doctrine of reasonable expectations. See, e.g.,
Deni Assocs. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So.2d 1135, 1140 (Fla. 1998); Farmers Ins. Co. v.
Talbot, 987 P.2d 1043, 1049 (Idaho 1999); Ins. Co. v. Adkisson, 459 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Il. App. Ct.
1984); Sterling Merch. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 506 N.E.2d 1192, 1196 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986); Allen v.
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 801-07 (Utah 1992).
127 See Rabdert, supra note 116, at 338. See also Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwrit-
ers Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 395 (Ariz. 1984) ("[M]ost insureds develop a 'reasonable expectation' that
every loss will be covered by their policy."); Allen, 839 P.2d at 803 n.6 ("[F]orm contracts are essential
to the economic vitality of the insurance industry.").
128 See, e.g., Stordahl v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 63, 65-66 (Alaska 1977). The rea-
sonable expectations doctrine is closely akin to the doctrine of contracts of adhesion. According to the
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an otherwise clear and unambiguous policy if: (1) the insurer knew or
should have known of the insured's expectations; (2) the insurer created or
helped to create those expectations; or (3) the insured's expectations are
objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances and facts of the case. 129
The primary issues in challenges based upon the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine are: (1) whether the doctrine has been adopted in the respec-
tive jurisdiction; 130 and (2) whether it is applicable in light of the facts of
the case. Thus, in Krause v. Krause,13 1 the court, in the context of a step-
down provision contained in the uninsured motorist coverage, observed that
Iowa law recognizes the doctrine. 32 However, in terms of application:
The doctrine is carefully circumscribed and does not contemplate the expansion of coverage
on a general equitable basis. It can only be invoked when an exclusion "(1) is bizarre or op-
pressive, (2) eviscerates terms explicitly agreed to, or (3) eliminates the dominant purpose of
the transaction." A preliminary criterion must be satisfied before we apply the doctrine. The
policy must either be such that an ordinary layperson would misunderstand its coverage, or
there must be circumstances attributable to the insurer which would foster coverage expecta-
tions. 133
The plaintiff in Krause failed to present any evidence of overt actions or
misrepresentations on the part of the insurer. 134 Instead, plaintiff contended
that the policy's use of the phrase "financial responsibility law of Iowa"
was so vague that an ordinary person would be unable to ascertain the cov-
erage provided.135 The court rejected this argument as a substitute for the
requisite evidence and concluded that the reasonable expectations doctrine
was inapplicable. 136
C. Ambiguity
The doctrine of ambiguity is one of the oldest and most used variance
principles. It differs significantly from the principle of honoring the reason-
able expectations of the insured in many respects, not the least of which is
that it often produces results that are more favorable to the insured than
would a decision based on reasonable expectations. 137 The rule of ambigu-
ity provides that an ambiguity in a contract will be construed against its
doctrine of contracts of adhesion where there is unequal bargaining power between the parties so that
one party controls all of the terms and offers the contract on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the contract will
be strictly construed against the party who drafted it.
129 See supra note 126.
130 See supra note 126.
131 589 N.W.2d 721 (Iowa 1999).
132 Id. at 727.




137 See infra note 157.
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drafter and in favor of the non-drafting party.'3 8 A contract is ambiguous
when a word, phrase, or provision in the contract has, or is susceptible to,
more than one reasonable interpretation when the policy is read as a
whole.'39 Ambiguity in an insurance policy can arise from inconsistent pol-
icy provisions, policy organization, or ambiguous language. A number of
jurisdictions also take the position that ambiguity can arise from inconsis-
tent judicial interpretations."4 Whether a provision is ambiguous is a ques-
tion of law for the court to resolve. 4 ' Determining whether inconsistent
policy provisions or poor policy organization creates ambiguity requires
little more than an examination of the entire policy and application of the
controlling rule.' 42 Charges of ambiguity based on the use of ambiguous
language requires the application of a detailed legal analysis.
143
Challenges to step-down provisions based on the use of ambiguous
language have universally failed.'" Universal Underwriters Insurance Co.
v. Metropolitan Property & Life Insurance Co. 145 is the seminal case in-
volving a challenge based on ambiguous language. In Universal Under-
writers, respondent Universal Underwriters was the insurer of Morris Mo-
tors-a car dealership."4 An employee of the dealership, Mr. Pulcino, was
injured while riding as a passenger in a car owned by Morris Motor and
being test-driven by a customer of the dealership. 47 Pulcino sued the cus-
tomer, who was insured by Metropolitan Property & Life Insurance Com-
pany. 148 The customer was also a permissive insured under the policy is-
138 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 3, at 628.
139 See, e.g., U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gen. Reinsurance Corp., 949 F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 1991) (ap-
plying New York substantive law); Federated Guar. Life Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 439 So.2d 1283, 1285 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1983); Delgado v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 262, 271 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984);
Nat'l Cas. Co. v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 741, 746 (Colo. 1992); Murr v. Selag Corp., 747
P.2d 1302, 1310 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 754 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988); Union Ins. Co. v. Land & Sky, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 773, 776 (Neb. 1995); Graber v. Eng-
strom, 384 N.W.2d 307, 309 (N.D. 1986); Weisman v. Green Tree Ins. Co., 670 A.2d 160, 161 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1996); Greendig v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 891 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1994); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, 243 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1951); Baehmer v. Viking
Ins. Co., 827 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Wash. C. App. 1992); Pilling v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 500
S.E.2d 870, 872 (W. Va. 1997).
140 See supra note 6.
141 See generally 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 339 (2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. d (1981).
142 For a detailed discussion, see Johnny Parker, The Wacky World of Collision and Comprehen-
sive Coverages: Intentional Injury and Illegal Activities Exclusions, 79 NEB. L. REv. 75, 101 (2000).
143 See sources cited supra note 139.
144 See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Co. v. Pierrousakos, 255 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2001); Mid-Century Ins. Co.
v. Haynes, 218 Cal. App. 3d 737 (1990); Windsor Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 24 S.W.3d 151 (Mo. Ct. App.
2000).
145 380 S.E.2d 858 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
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sued to Morris Motors by Universal.149 Both insurers were called upon to
defend.15 ° Universal contended that its liability was limited to $15,000-the
minimum mandated by the South Carolina Motor Vehicle Financial Re-
sponsibility Act.'51 The trial court agreed with Universal and Pulcino ap-
pealed. 15
2
One of the two issues addressed by the court on appeal was whether
the trial court erred in ruling that no ambiguity existed in the policy and
that, therefore, coverage is limited to the statutory minimum.'53 In affirming
the trial court's decision, the appellate court observed that: "Written in the
turgid vernacular typical of insurance policies, the language of the policy
issued by Universal is stylistically inelegant but, when carefully read, un-
mistakable in its meaning." '54 Courts throughout the country rely on this
passage when addressing challenges based upon ambiguous language. 155
III. CONSEQUENCE OF A SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGE
Application of the doctrines of reasonable expectations or ambiguity
usually result in the policy being construed against the insurer and in favor
of coverage. 56 In terms of practical application, this generally means that
the insured or person claiming coverage is entitled to the full protection
afforded by the policy.157 This rule is controlling in nature and generally,





153 Id. at 860.
154 Id.
155 See, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Hill, 955 P.2d 1333 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998).
Universal Underwriters' policy, like most comprehensive insurance policies, does
not make for easy reading, especially when the relevant portions of the policy are
taken from a number of different sections of the contract. Although walking
through these various provisions is cumbersome and stylistically inelegant, it does
not seem that a reasonable person would be misled as to the policy limits for per-
missive users.
Id. at 1337. See also Windsor v. Lucas, 24 S.W.3d 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
156 See supra Parts ll.B, IUC.
157 KEETON & WlDiss, supra note 3, at 628 n.4.
In some situations, an unqualified practice of resolving ambiguities against the in-
surer produces results that are more favorable to the insured than would a decision
based on honoring reasonable expectations. For example, even though the contrac-
tual language was ambiguous, there might be no expectation at all, or the expecta-
tion might be unreasonable, thus defeating a claimed expansion of coverage beyond
the letter of the contract. It seems likely that there has always been an implicit un-
derstanding that ambiguities, which in most cases might be resolved in more than
just one or the other of two ways, would be resolved favorably to the insured's
claim only if a reasonable person in the insured's position would have expected
coverage.
Id.
158 See supra Part nl.C.
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ing a successful challenge based upon violation of a statute, the issue of
what policy limits apply to permissive users-those required by law or the
full limits of the policy-arises and must be subjected to further analysis.
How this issue is resolved is as important as the initial issue of whether the
step-down provision is enforceable.
For example, in Rao v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., the
court concluded that the step-down provision was unenforceable.' 59 Never-
theless, the court held that the insurer, for policy reasons, was only liable
for the statutory minimum limits of coverage. 1"° This result is not as absurd
as it appears because enforcement of the step-down provision in Rao would
have allowed the insurer to avoid responsibility entirely. Furthermore, some
courts have adopted the statutory minimum limits of coverage as the appli-
cable rule in a variety of circumstances.'61
Adoption of the statutory minimum limits of coverage as the applica-
ble rule when a step-down provision is deemed unenforceable is consistent
with two general principles of contract interpretation. The first principle is
the rule of contract severability. Pursuant to this rule, if it is possible to
sever an unenforceable portion of a contract or provision from an otherwise
enforceable portion of the contract or provision, the court may nevertheless
enforce the remainder of the agreement. 16 2 The second principle is the right
to freedom of contract. 163 Insurers, exercising their right to contract freely,
uniformly include in insurance policies a clause that provides that "if any
part of this policy is in conflict with local, state or federal law, those provi-
sions in conflict will automatically change to conform to the law."" 6
Neither of these principles, however, is without limits. "A court may
treat only a part of a term as unenforceable ... if the party who seeks to
enforce the term obtained it in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
standards of fair dealing." 165 Furthermore, despite the clich6 that insurance
contracts are said "to be like any other contract to which general rules of
contract interpretation are applicable" the reality is that they are not.166
159 Rao v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 549 A.2d 1259, 1266 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
160 Id.
161 See, e.g., Nichols v. Anderson, 837 F.2d 1372, 1376 (5th Cir. 1988); American Tours, Inc. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 338 S.E.2d 92, 98 (N.C. 1986); Davis v. DeFrank, 306 N.Y.S.2d 827, 830 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1970); cf. Meyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 585, 588-89 (Colo. 1984).
162 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184(1) (1981).
163 See sources cited supra note 48.
164 See, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Hill, 955 P.2d 1333, 1338 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998).
165 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184(2) (1981).
166 Though the rule that insurance contracts are to be interpreted like any other contract is univer-
sally accepted, decisional law certainly supports the view that insurance contracts are inherently differ-
ent from other types of private contracts. This difference supports the application of a higher standard of
judicial review or alternative interpretive principles. "Because an insurance policy is an adhesion con-
tract and is not generally the result of an arms-length negotiations, courts have developed rules of con-
struction which differ from those applied to most other contracts." Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925, 926 (Del. 1982). See also supra note 2. It has been observed that:
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One does not have "liberty of contract" unless organized society forbears and enforces, for-
bears to penalize him for making his bargain and enforces it for him after it is made....
There are many contract transactions that are definitely forbidden by the law, forbidden un-
der pains and penalties assessed for crime and tort; and there are many more such transac-
tions that are denied judicial enforcement, even though their makers are not subjected to af-
firmative pains and penalties.
167
Consequently, any rule that encourages insurers to attempt to gain ad-
vantage from their superior bargaining position should be discouraged.
68
These limitations suggest that the better view, in the absence of statutory
authority to the contrary, is that the insurer should be liable for the full pol-
icy limits available.'69 The full policy limits remedy is also more pragmatic
than the statutory minimum remedy because it prevents an insurance com-
pany from receiving the benefits of an otherwise unenforceable provision.
A significant number of state legislatures have enacted, as a part of
their motor vehicle safety responsibility laws, statutes that seemingly sup-
port the adoption of the statutory minimum limits as the applicable rule in
cases involving successful challenges to step-down clauses.17 0 The statutory
Although the notion that an insurance contract should be interpreted by reference to
the principles that govern the interpretation of any contract is alive and well, it is
also clear that many decisions cannot be explained cogently by reference to ordi-
nary principles of contract interpretation. In these cases, courts have either explic-
itly or implicitly recognized that insurance policies have special characteristics and
must be construed with reference to special, perhaps unique standards. Professor
James Fischer has described the rules of insurance contract interpretation as ones
that "build on general rules applicable to all contracts" but which "are... more than
simplistic extensions of the basic rules of contract" and which "often have a sig-
nificant twist." Further he identifies three rules of insurance contract interpretation
found in some cases that have no contract law counterpart: coverage terms are in-
terpreted liberally while exclusions are interpreted narrowly; insurance policies are
to be interpreted consistently with a layperson's understanding; if possible, policies
are to be construed so to achieve the purpose of providing indemnity. All of this
adds up to a decidedly pro-insured bias in insurance policy interpretation, and in-
vites the question as to whether giving insurance policies special treatment is ap-
propriate.
JERRY, supra note 15, at 135-36.
167 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CONTRACrS 20 (West 1963).
168 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTs § 184 cmt. a.
169 See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Notter, 837 F. Supp. 661, 669 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (applying Pennsyl-
vania law); Fryer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 A.2d 225, 227-28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (construing provision
to be unenforceable escape clause; consequently, full liability coverage was available); Mid-Century
Ins. Co. v. Lyon, 562 N.W.2d 888, 892 (S.D. 1997); cf Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d 922,
927 (Utah 1993) (reserving issue of what policy limits apply to permissive users in the absence of those
imposed by an unenforceable step-down provision).
170 ALA. CODE § 32-7-22(g) (2000); ALASKA STAT. § 2 8 .2 0.4 40(g) (Michie 2000); id. §
28.22.121(a) (Michie 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 28-4009(D) (West 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-
19-713(g) (Michie 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §2902(g) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 287-30
(2000); IDAHO CODE § 49-1212(6) (Michie 2000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321A.21(7) (West 2000); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:900(G) (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.520 (g) (1999); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 63-15-43(7) (2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 303.190(7) (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-6-
103(8) (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-539 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. 485.3091(6) (2000); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-279.21(g) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-16.1-11(7) (2000); OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. §
4509.55(A) (West 2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 7-324(g) (1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 742.464 (1999);
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language in these jurisdictions provides that a policy that grants the cover-
age required for a motor vehicle liability policy may also grant lawful cov-
erage in excess of or in addition to the coverage specified for a policy and
the excess or additional coverage is not subject to other statutory provi-
sions. With respect to a policy that grants excess or additional coverage, the
term "motor vehicle liability policy" applies only to that part of the cover-
age that is required by the statute. 171 Statutes of this nature support a num-




The success that the insurance industry has experienced regarding
step-down provisions is unequaled in the annals of automobile insurance
litigation. Much of this success is attributable to compulsory automobile
liability insurance statutes. The industry has only recently come to under-
stand that public policy is a paradigm composed of diverse private interests.
In many instances, ascertainment and protection of these interests fall
within the exclusive domain of the judicial branch. However, as has been
the case with compulsory liability insurance, these interests are at times
ascertained and expressed in statutory form. When this is the case, much of
the uncertainty regarding what constitutes public policy and how it is to be
protected is removed. In essence, statutory expressions of policy can, and in
many instances do, effectively eliminate judicial discretion and short circuit
the application of equitable principles such as the doctrine of ambiguity and
honoring the reasonable expectation of the insured.
For every action there is an opposite and equal reaction. However, as
has been demonstrated by this discussion of the step-down clause, equilib-
rium, even in a turbulent environment, can be achieved. It is important to
remember that equity is the exclusive domain of the judiciary and cannot be
totally abrogated. Consequently, the possibility that the courts will do an
about face and renew its pro-insured course across the turbulent sea of in-
surance litigation remains a viable possibility.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-32-24(g) (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-20(5)(d) (Law. Co-op. 1999); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 32-35-75 (Michie 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-12-122(0 (1999); TEx. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. § 601.078(b)-(c) (Vernon 2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.29.490(7) (2000); W. VA. CODE §
17D-4-12(g) (2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3 1-9 -4 05(g) (Michie 2000).
171 See sources cited supra note 170.
172 See, e.g., Collins v. Farmers Ins. Co., 822 P.2d 1146, 1151 (Or. 1991) (finding statutory lan-
guage supports insurer's argument that exclusion is unenforceable only to the extent of the limits of the
Financial Responsibility Law); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042, 1043-44
(Utah 1987) (finding statutory language persuasive); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Massey, 346 S.E.2d
268, 270 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (holding insurance in excess of that required by law is considered to be
voluntary coverage subject to the terms of the policy); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shelly, 231
N.W.2d 641, 641-42 (Mich. 1975).
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